Bribing in first-price auctions (vol 77, pg 214, 2013)

被引：1
|
作者：
Kotowski, Maciej H. [1 ]
Rachmilevitch, Shiran [2 ]
机构：
[1] Harvard Univ, John F Kennedy Sch Govt, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Univ Haifa, Dept Econ, IL-31999 Haifa, Israel
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2014年 / 87卷
关键词：
Bribes; Collusion; First-price auctions;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.008
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We clarify the sufficient condition for a trivial equilibrium to exist in the model of Rachmilevitch (2013). (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：616 / 618
页数：3
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Bribing in first-price auctions
    Rachmilevitch, Shiran
    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2013, 77 (01) : 214 - 228
  • [2] Commitment in first-price auctions
    Xu, Yunjian
    Ligett, Katrina
    ECONOMIC THEORY, 2018, 66 (02) : 449 - 489
  • [3] Commitment in first-price auctions
    Yunjian Xu
    Katrina Ligett
    Economic Theory, 2018, 66 : 449 - 489
  • [4] Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions
    Zhang, Wenzhang
    THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 2022, 17 (04) : 1847 - 1895
  • [5] Effects of competition in first-price auctions
    Loyola, Gino
    ECONOMIC THEORY, 2021, 71 (04) : 1527 - 1567
  • [6] The affiliation effect in first-price auctions
    Pinkse, J
    Tan, GF
    ECONOMETRICA, 2005, 73 (01) : 263 - 277
  • [7] Effects of competition in first-price auctions
    Gino Loyola
    Economic Theory, 2021, 71 : 1527 - 1567
  • [8] Participation constraints in first-price auctions
    Cao, Xiaoyong
    Hsueh, Shao-Chieh
    Tian, Guoqiang
    Wang, Wei
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 2024, 53 (02) : 609 - 634
  • [9] First-price auctions with unobservable entry
    Cao, Xiaoyong
    Wang, Wei
    ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2024, 239
  • [10] Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
    Cheng, Harrison
    ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2011, 111 (01) : 78 - 80
12345