Does the Firm Information Environment Influence Financing Decisions? A Test Using Disclosure Regulation

被引:15
作者
Albring, Susan [1 ]
Banyi, Monica [2 ]
Dhaliwal, Dan [3 ,4 ]
Pereira, Raynolde [5 ]
机构
[1] Syracuse Univ, Joseph I Lubin Sch Accounting, Martin J Whitman Sch Management, Syracuse, NY 13244 USA
[2] Univ Virginia, McIntire Sch Commerce, Charlottesville, VA 22904 USA
[3] Univ Arizona, Dept Accounting, Eller Coll Management, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
[4] Korea Univ, Sch Business, Seoul, South Korea
[5] Univ Missouri, Trulaske Coll Business, Sch Accountancy, Columbia, MO 65211 USA
关键词
information environment; financing decisions; disclosure; capital structure; Reg FD; CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS; REGULATION FAIR DISCLOSURE; REGULATION FD; REG FD; COST; ANALYST; MARKET; LITIGATION; CREDIT; CHOICE;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.2014.2123
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Extant theory claims a firm's information environment impacts the choice between debt and equity financing. However, empirical evidence supporting this contention is limited. We evaluate this relation within the context of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), which prohibited the use of selective disclosure. We find that firms with high proprietary costs of public disclosure are more likely to resort to debt financing following the passage of Reg FD. This relation is not sensitive to whether a firm has relied on selective disclosure in the pre-Reg FD regime. We also evaluate changes in firm disclosure policy and find that firms that adopted an expansive public disclosure policy are more likely to turn to equity financing. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the pecking order theory: firms with deteriorated firm information environments increase their use of less information-sensitive debt, whereas firms with improved information environments favor the use of equity financing.
引用
收藏
页码:456 / 478
页数:23
相关论文
共 59 条
[1]   Who is afraid of Reg FD? The behavior and performance of sell-side analysts following the SEC's Fair Disclosure rules [J].
Agrawal, Anup ;
Chadha, Sahiba ;
Chen, Mark A. .
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 2006, 79 (06) :2811-2834
[2]   Regulation fair disclosure and earnings information: Market, analyst, and corporate responses [J].
Bailey, W ;
Li, HT ;
Mao, CX ;
Zhong, R .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2003, 58 (06) :2487-2514
[3]   Market timing and capital structure [J].
Baker, M ;
Wurgler, J .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2002, 57 (01) :1-32
[4]   Fair value accounting for liabilities and own credit risk [J].
Barth, Mary E. ;
Hodder, Leslie D. ;
Stubben, Stephen R. .
ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2008, 83 (03) :629-664
[5]   Disentangling mandatory IFRS reporting and changes in enforcement [J].
Barth, Mary E. ;
Israeli, Doron .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2013, 56 (2-3) :178-188
[6]   Does Asymmetric Information Drive Capital Structure Decisions? [J].
Bharath, Sreedhar T. ;
Pasquariello, Paolo ;
Wu, Guojun .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2009, 22 (08) :3211-3243
[7]  
Botosan CA, 1997, ACCOUNT REV, V72, P323
[8]   Managerial and investor responses to disclosure regulation: The case of Reg FD and conference calls [J].
Bushee, BJ ;
Matsumoto, DA ;
Miller, GS .
ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2004, 79 (03) :617-643
[9]   Analyst coverage and financing decisions [J].
Chang, Xin ;
Dasgupta, Sudipto ;
Hilary, Gilles .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2006, 61 (06) :3009-3048
[10]   Regulation fair disclosure and the cost of equity capital [J].
Chen, Zhihong ;
Dhaliwal, Dan S. ;
Xie, Hong .
REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES, 2010, 15 (01) :106-144