Size versus stability in the marriage problem

被引:43
作者
Biro, Peter [1 ]
Manlove, David F. [1 ]
Mittal, Shubham [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Glasgow, Dept Comp Sci, Glasgow G12 8QQ, Lanark, Scotland
[2] Indian Inst Technol, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, New Delhi 110016, India
基金
英国工程与自然科学研究理事会;
关键词
Stable marriage problem; Stable matching; Blocking pair; Blocking agent; Inapproximability result; Polynomial-time algorithm; MATCHINGS; MARKET;
D O I
10.1016/j.tcs.2010.02.003
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
Given an instance I of the classical Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete preference lists (SMI), a maximum cardinality matching can be larger than a stable matching. In many large-scale applications of SMI, we seek to match as many agents as possible. This motivates the problem of finding a maximum cardinality matching in I that admits the smallest number of blocking pairs (so is "as stable as possible"). We show that this problem is NP-hard and not approximable within n(1-epsilon), for any epsilon > 0, unless P = NP, where n is the number of men in I. Further, even if all preference lists are of length at most 3, we show that the problem remains NP-hard and not approximable within delta, for some delta > 1. By contrast, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for the case where the preference lists of one sex are of length at most 2. We also extend these results to the cases where (i) preference lists may include ties, and (ii) we seek to minimize the number of agents involved in a blocking pair. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1828 / 1841
页数:14
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