Joint bidding and horizontal subcontracting

被引：2

作者：

Bouckaert, Jan ^{[1
,2
]}

Van Moer, Geert ^{[3
,4
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Antwerp, Oxera, Dept Econ, Prinsstr 13, B-2000 Antwerp, Belgium

[2] Univ Libre Bruxelles, ECARES, Prinsstr 13, B-2000 Antwerp, Belgium

[3] Hanken Sch Econ, Dept Finance & Econ, POB 479, Helsinki 00101, Finland

[4] Helsinki Grad Sch Econ, POB 479, Helsinki 00101, Finland

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2021年 / 76卷

关键词：

Joint bidding; Horizontal subcontracting; Buyer power; PUBLIC PROCUREMENT; AUCTIONS; MERGERS; 1ST-PRICE; ENTRY; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102727

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper investigates joint bidding when firms have incentives to sign subcontracts with each other after competing in the bidding stage. A bidding consortium affects the horizontal subcontracting market and, through backward induction, alters firms' bids. Our findings challenge the current legal practice that consortia without efficiencies must pass the "no-solo-bidding test", requiring that its members could not bid stand-alone. Our framework predicts that the formation of a temporary consortium, which has the feature that it dissolves after submitting a losing bid, benefits the procurer. The winning bid is more competitive with a temporary as compared to a structural consortium. (c) 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V.

引用

页数：19

共 42 条

[1] REGULATING JOINT BIDDING IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT [J].