Last-minute bidding in eBay charity auctions

被引：10

作者：

Elfenbein, Daniel W. ^{[1
]}

McManus, Brian ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Washington Univ, John M Olin Sch Business, St Louis, MO 63130 USA

[2] Univ N Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2010年 / 107卷 / 01期

关键词：

Charity auctions; Bid timing; Bid sniping; Preferences for giving; Online auctions; INTERNET AUCTIONS; RULES;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.021

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Relative to typical eBay auctions, bidding in eBay charity auctions occurs earlier and also less frequently in the auctions' final seconds. This suggests that some charity bidders benefit from driving-up others' payments, as when auction revenue is a public good. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：42 / 45

页数：4

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