CAD-Base: An Attack Vector into the Electronics Supply Chain

被引：39

作者：

Basu, Kanad ^{[1
]}

Saeed, Samah Mohamed ^{[2
]}

Pilato, Christian ^{[3
]}

Ashraf, Mohammed ^{[4
]}

Nabeel, Mohammed Thari ^{[4
]}

Chakrabarty, Krishnendu ^{[5
]}

Karri, Ramesh ^{[6
]}

机构：

[1] NYU, 2 MetroTech Ctr, Brooklyn, NY 11201 USA

[2] CUNY, New York, NY 10021 USA

[3] Politecn Milan, Milan, Italy

[4] New York Univ, Abu Dhabi, U Arab Emirates

[5] Duke Univ, Durham, NC 27706 USA

[6] NYU, New York, NY 10003 USA

来源：

ACM TRANSACTIONS ON DESIGN AUTOMATION OF ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS | 2019年 / 24卷 / 04期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Electronic design automation; hardware security; computer-aided design; HIGH-LEVEL SYNTHESIS;

D O I：

10.1145/3315574

中图分类号：

TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

Fabless semiconductor companies design system-on-chips (SoC) by using third-party intellectual property (IP) cores and fabricate them in offshore, potentially untrustworthy foundries. Owing to the globally distributed electronics supply chain, security has emerged as a serious concern. In this article, we explore electronics computer-aided design (CAD) software as a threat vector that can be exploited to introduce vulnerabilities into the SoC. We show that all electronics CAD tools-high-level synthesis, logic synthesis, physical design, verification, test, and post-silicon validation-are potential threat vectors to different degrees. We have demonstrated CAD-based attacks on several benchmarks, including the commercial ARM Cortex M0 processor [1].

引用

页数：30

共 71 条

[1] Trojan detection using IC fingerprinting [J].