My aim in this essay is to show that the grave problem that arises for Wittgenstein at the end of the Tractatus, namely, that his propositions are simultaneously both elucidatory and nonsensical, as a matter of fact arises out of a certain misunderstanding on the author's part, a confusion that the later Wittgenstein easily avoids. I have in mind the fact that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein sees logic as what is most universal (logic is always the logic of the world and the logic of language), whereas what as a matter of fact emerges from his discussion is that it is language what is the most universal "thing': This gives us the clue to understand the paradox of the Tractatus. On the other hand, I discuss the distinction, originally drawn by J. van Heijenoort, between logic as calculus and logic as language trying to show that in last analysis it is a spurious one. i also examine Bertrand Russell's peculiar universalism, which concerns logic but not language, emphasizing that he doesn't seem to have been aware of the problem Frege and Wittgenstein did perceive, i.e., the impossibility of stating by means of language the Otter's logical features. Finally, I review the later Wittgenstein's stance which is still universalistic concerning language but also relativistic. I argue that what Wittgenstein abandons is the absolutism of his first point of view, leaning towards the idea that logic is nothing else than "a bunch of calculi': The main thesis of the essay is that the Tractatus's paradox simply cannot reappear again within the context of the later Wittgenstein's philosophy.
