FREQUENT JOB CHANGES CAN SIGNAL POOR WORK ATTITUDE AND REDUCE EMPLOYABILITY

被引:7
作者
Cohn, Alain [1 ]
Marechal, Michel Andre [2 ]
Schneider, Frederic [3 ]
Weber, Roberto A. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Michigan, Sch Informat, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[2] Univ Zurich, Dept Econ, Zurich, Switzerland
[3] Univ Cambridge, Judge Business Sch, Cambridge, England
关键词
LABOR-MARKET; FIELD EXPERIMENTS; PERSONALITY; DISCRIMINATION; EARNINGS; DETERMINANTS; MOBILITY; WAGES; UNEMPLOYMENT; RECIPROCITY;
D O I
10.1093/jeea/jvaa017
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study whether employment history provides information about a worker's "work attitude", that is, the tendency to act cooperatively and reliably in the workplace. We conjecture that, holding all else equal, frequent job changes can indicate poor work attitude and that this information is transmitted through employment histories. We find support for this hypothesis across three studies that employ complementary laboratory, field, and survey experiments, as well as in labor market panel data. First, a tightly controlled laboratory labor market experiment demonstrates that prior employment information allows employers to screen for reliable and cooperative workers and that these workers obtain better employment outcomes. Secondly, we conduct a field experiment that varies the frequency of job changes in applicants' resumes and find that those with fewer job changes receive substantially more callbacks from prospective employers. Thirdly, a survey experiment with human resources professionals confirms that the resume manipulations in the field study create different perceptions of work attitude and that these largely account for the callback differences. Finally, we find evidence consistent with our hypothesized relationships in empirical labor market data. Our work highlights the potential importance of job history as a signal of work attitude in labor markets, and points to a potential cost of frequent job changes.
引用
收藏
页码:475 / 508
页数:34
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