Do long-term investors improve corporate decision making?

被引：165

作者：

Harford, Jarrad ^{[1
]}

Kecskes, Ambrus ^{[2
]}

Mansi, Sattar ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Washington, Seattle, WA 98195 USA

[2] York Univ, Schulich Sch Business, N York, ON, Canada

[3] Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2018年 / 50卷

关键词：

Agency problems; Monitoring; Managerial myopia; Investor horizons; Corporate governance; Managerial misbehavior; Investment; Innovation; Financing; Off balance sheet debt; Debt maturity; SHAREHOLDER INVESTMENT HORIZONS; EXPECTED STOCK RETURNS; HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP; PAYOUT POLICY; MANAGERIAL DISCRETION; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; EQUITY PRICES; OPTION AWARDS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.09.022

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We study the effect of investor horizons on a comprehensive set of corporate decisions. We argue that monitoring by long-term investors generates decision making that maximizes shareholder value. We find that long-term investors strengthen governance and restrain managerial misbehaviors such as earnings management and financial fraud. They discourage a range of investment and financing activities but encourage payouts. Innovation increases, in quantity and quality. Shareholders benefit through higher profitability that the stock market does not fully anticipate, and lower risk. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：424 / 452

页数：29

共 95 条

[1] The "Wall Street Walk" and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice [J].