How robust is laboratory gift exchange?

被引：75
作者：
Charness, G [1 ]
Frechette, GR
Kagel, JH
机构：
[1] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Dept Econ, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Boston, MA 02163 USA
[3] Ohio State Univ, Dept Econ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
来源：
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS | 2004年 / 7卷 / 02期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
gift exchange; robustness; framing;
D O I：
10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026979.14590.3c
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr et al. (1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the European studies typically feature a high degree of gift exchange, the few U.S. studies provide some conflicting results. We find that the degree of gift exchange is surprisingly sensitive to an apparently innocuous change-whether or not a comprehensive payoff table is provided in the instructions. We also find significant and substantial time trends in responder behavior.
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页码：189 / 205
页数：17
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