Decentralized Mining in Centralized Pools

被引:100
作者
Cong, Lin William [1 ]
He, Zhiguo [2 ,3 ]
Li, Jiasun [4 ]
机构
[1] Cornell Univ, SC Johnson Coll Business, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
[2] Univ Chicago, Booth Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[4] George Mason Univ, Sch Business, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
关键词
ENERGY-CONSUMPTION; BLOCKCHAIN;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhaa040
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The rise of centralized mining pools for risk sharing does not necessarily undermine the decentralization required for blockchains: because of miners' cross-pool diversification and pool managers' endogenous fee setting, larger pools better internalize their externality on global hash rates, charge higher fees, attract disproportionately fewer miners, and grow more slowly. Instead, mining pools as a financial innovation escalate miners' arms race and significantly increase the energy consumption of proof-of-work-based blockchains. Empirical evidence from Bitcoin mining supports our model's predictions. The economic insights inform other consensus protocols and the industrial organization of mainstream sectors with similar characteristics but ambiguous prior findings.
引用
收藏
页码:1191 / 1235
页数:45
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