Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games

被引:4
作者
Forges, Francoise [1 ,2 ]
Horst, Ulrich [3 ]
Salomon, Antoine [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Paris 09, CEREMADE, F-75775 Paris, France
[2] Univ Paris 09, PSL, LEDa, Paris, France
[3] Humboldt Univ, Dept Math, D-10099 Berlin, Germany
关键词
Commitment; Cooperative solution; Joint plan equilibrium; Folk theorem; Private information; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; EQUILIBRIA; SEPARATION; EXISTENCE; PAYOFFS; THEOREM;
D O I
10.1007/s00182-015-0520-8
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We define feasible, posterior individually rational solutions for two-person Bayesian games with a single informed player. Such a solution can be achieved by direct signalling from the informed player and requires approval of both players after the signal has been sent. Without further assumptions on the Bayesian game, a solution does not necessarily exist. We show that, if the uninformed player has a "uniform punishment strategy" against the informed one, the existence of a solution follows from the existence of Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games with lack of information on one side. We also consider the extension of the result when both players have private information.
引用
收藏
页码:11 / 36
页数:26
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