Collusion-Proof under Yardstick Competition: A Discriminatory Scheme

被引：0

作者：

Bi, ChenFei ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Harbin Univ Commerce, Acad Econ, Harbin 150028, Peoples R China

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF 2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LOGISTICS SYSTEMS AND INTELLIGENT MANAGEMENT, VOLS 1-3 | 2010年

关键词：

Yardstick Competition; Discrimination; Principal-Agent;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TH [机械、仪表工业];

学科分类号：

0802 ;

摘要：

An important limitation of yardstick competition is due to its susceptibility to collusive manipulation. The degree which the regulated firms manage to conspire is affected by the particulars of the scheme. The incentives for collusion among firms when an industry is regulated by means of yardstick competition are analysed in a Principal-Agent framework, and we propose the optimal collusion-proof contract is to introduce a "discriminatory scheme" in the sense that it can improve the efficiency of yardstick competition by developing interest conflict among the regulated firms.

引用

页码：1726 / 1729

页数：4

共 8 条

[1] ECONOMICALLY OPTIMAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND CONTROL-SYSTEMS [J].

BAIMAN, S ;

DEMSKI, JS .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1980, 18 :184-220

[2]

CHEN Z, 2005, DIVIDE CONQUER

[3]

CHEN ZJ, 2003, CHINA EC Q, V3, P195

[4] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS IN THE PRESENCE OF CAREER CONCERNS - THEORY AND EVIDENCE [J].

GIBBONS, R ;

MURPHY, KJ .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1992, 100 (03) :468-505

[5]

GUO QH, 2008, THEORY PRACTICE FINA, V29, P94

[6] Collusion and discrimination in organizations [J].

Ishiguro, S .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2004, 116 (02) :357-369

[7] Collusion under yardstick competition: an experimental study [J].

Potters, J ;

Rockenbach, B ;

Sadrieh, A ;

van Damme, E .

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 2004, 22 (07) :1017-1038

[8]

SHLEIFER A, 1985, RAND J ECON, V16, P19

← 1 →