On the topology of the set of Nash equilibria

被引：2

作者：

Balkenborg, Dieter ^{[1
]}

Vermeulen, Dries ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Exeter, TARC, Rennes Dr, Exeter EX4 4PU, Devon, England

[2] Univ Maastricht, Dept Quantitat Econ, POB 616, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2019年 / 118卷

关键词：

Strategic form games; Nash equilibrium; Topology; UNIVERSALITY; EVOLUTIONARY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.008

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

It has been an open conjecture in the theory of non-cooperative games that Nash equilibrium is universal for the collection of (non-empty) compact semi-algebraic sets, meaning that for every such set there is a game whose set of Nash equilibria is homeomorphic to the given set. In this paper we prove this conjecture. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1 / 6

页数：6

共 16 条

[1] On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria [J].