The Burden of the Nondiversifiable Risk of Entrepreneurship

被引:154
作者
Hall, Robert E. [1 ,2 ]
Woodward, Susan E. [3 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Hoover Inst, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[3] Sand Hill Econometr, Palo Alto, CA 94301 USA
关键词
VENTURE CAPITALISTS; CONTRACTS;
D O I
10.1257/aer.100.3.1163
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Entrepreneurship is risky. We study the risk facing a well-documented and important class of entrepreneurs, those backed by venture capital. Using a dynamic program, we calculate the certainty-equivalent of the difference between the cash rewards that entrepreneurs actually received over the past 20 years and the cash that entrepreneurs would have received from a risk-free salaried job. The payoff to a venture-backed entrepreneur comprises a below-market salary and a share of the equity value of the company when it goes public or is acquired. We find that the typical venture-backed entrepreneur received an average of $5.8 million in exit cash. Almost three-quarters of entrepreneurs receive nothing at exit and a few receive over a billion dollars. Because of the extreme dispersion of payoffs, an entrepreneur with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of two places a certainty equivalent value only slightly greater than zero on the distribution of outcomes she faces at the time of her company's launch.
引用
收藏
页码:1163 / 1194
页数:32
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