When do economic sanctions work? Asymmetric perceptions, issue salience, and outcomes

被引:66
作者
Ang, Adrian U-Jin [1 ]
Peksen, Dursun [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211 USA
关键词
economic sanctions; sanctions outcomes; issue salience; asymmetric issue perception;
D O I
10.1177/1065912906298632
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
In this article, the authors examine perceptions of the salience of the issue under dispute by both sender and target states and their impact on sanction outcomes. They find that both the sender's perception of the salience of the issue and the asymmetry in perception of issue salience between sender and target favoring sender states have significant and dramatic effects on sanctions outcomes. This finding suggests that how states perceive the issue(s) at dispute matters in determining the likelihood of sanctions success and adds to our understanding of what determines sanctions outcomes.
引用
收藏
页码:135 / 145
页数:11
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