United Shoe Machinery and the antitrust significance of "free'' service

被引:0
|
作者
Blair, RD [1 ]
Herndon, JB [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Florida, Dept Econ, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA
关键词
antitrust; durable goods; leasing practices;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., United Shoe Machinery was found guilty of illegal monopolization due to its leasing practices. Existing scholarship on this case largely focuses on the issue of leasing versus selling. In contrast, we examine a particular practice of United's that was condemned: its policy of providing service for its leased machines without a separate service charge. Our analysis demonstrates that this practice served an important insurance function by shifting risk from the shoe manufacturers to United, a more efficient bearer of risk, and concludes that this practice was efficiency enhancing.
引用
收藏
页码:301 / 311
页数:11
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