共 40 条
Consequences of deviating from predicted CEO labor market compensation on long-term firm value
被引:20
|作者:
Fong, Eric A.
[1
]
Xing, Xuejing
[2
]
Orman, Wafa Hakim
[3
]
Mackenzie, William I., Jr.
[1
]
机构:
[1] Univ Alabama, Coll Business Adm, Dept Management & Mkt, Huntsville, AL 35899 USA
[2] Univ Alabama, Coll Business Adm, Dept Accounting & Finance, Huntsville, AL 35899 USA
[3] Univ Alabama, Coll Business Adm, Dept Econ & Informat Syst, Huntsville, AL 35899 USA
关键词:
CEO compensation;
Firm value;
Labor markets;
Tobin's Q;
MANAGERIAL REMUNERATION;
EXECUTIVE PAY;
PERFORMANCE;
DIVERSIFICATION;
PERSPECTIVE;
GOVERNANCE;
TOURNAMENT;
OWNERSHIP;
MATTER;
COSTS;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.07.004
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
Building upon labor market theory, we investigate whether under- or over-investing in CEOs (i.e., strategically paying above or below a CEO's predicted labor market compensation rate) affects long-term firm value and whether there are diminishing returns to these investments. Our results indicate that investments in CEOs are positively related to long-term firm value and that the relationship diminishes, eventually becoming negative, as investments increase. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码:299 / 305
页数:7
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