Consequences of deviating from predicted CEO labor market compensation on long-term firm value

被引:20
|
作者
Fong, Eric A. [1 ]
Xing, Xuejing [2 ]
Orman, Wafa Hakim [3 ]
Mackenzie, William I., Jr. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Alabama, Coll Business Adm, Dept Management & Mkt, Huntsville, AL 35899 USA
[2] Univ Alabama, Coll Business Adm, Dept Accounting & Finance, Huntsville, AL 35899 USA
[3] Univ Alabama, Coll Business Adm, Dept Econ & Informat Syst, Huntsville, AL 35899 USA
关键词
CEO compensation; Firm value; Labor markets; Tobin's Q; MANAGERIAL REMUNERATION; EXECUTIVE PAY; PERFORMANCE; DIVERSIFICATION; PERSPECTIVE; GOVERNANCE; TOURNAMENT; OWNERSHIP; MATTER; COSTS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.07.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Building upon labor market theory, we investigate whether under- or over-investing in CEOs (i.e., strategically paying above or below a CEO's predicted labor market compensation rate) affects long-term firm value and whether there are diminishing returns to these investments. Our results indicate that investments in CEOs are positively related to long-term firm value and that the relationship diminishes, eventually becoming negative, as investments increase. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:299 / 305
页数:7
相关论文
共 40 条