Platonic Ideas and Appearance in Aristotle's Topics

This study offers a new interpretation of a well-known Aristotelian argument against some basic tenets of Plato's theory of Ideas. The argument is formulated in Top. VI. 8, 146b36-147a11. According to Aristotle, in order to be successful, certain definitions require the presence of the qualification "apparent" in the definiens (e.g. "wish is a desire for the apparent good" and "appetite is a desire for the apparent pleasure"). Aristotle claims that for someone who believes in Platonic Ideas it would be difficult (if not impossible) to offer a definition of something apparent. The difficulty is particularly acute in the case of the apparent good. This happens because the Platonists (or at least some of them) believe that there cannot be Ideas of something apparent and that Ideas are spoken of relative to Ideas only. My reconstruction of the argument in the Topics shows that Aristotle does not purport intentionally to deceive his (Platonic) interlocutor (as some commentators claim). Nevertheless, he partly misses his target. The discussion of Aristotle's argument leads to an analysis of philosophically important points such as the qualification "apparent", the concept of "the apparent good", the possibility of different types of predication, and the behaviour of relatives.