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The minimum wage from a two-sided perspective
被引:16
作者:
Brown, Alessio J. G.
[4
]
Merkl, Christian
[1
,3
,4
]
Snower, Dennis J.
[1
,2
,4
,5
]
机构:
[1] Kiel Inst World Econ, Kiel, Germany
[2] Univ Kiel, Kiel, Germany
[3] Univ Erlangen Nurnberg, Nurnberg, Germany
[4] IZA, Bonn, Germany
[5] CEPR, Washington, DC USA
关键词:
Minimum wage;
Labor market;
Employment;
Unemployment;
Job offer;
Job acceptance;
D O I:
10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.020
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
This paper sheds new light on the effects of the minimum wage on employment from a two-sided theoretical perspective, in which firms' job offer and workers' job acceptance decisions are disentangled. Minimum wages reduce job offer incentives and increase job acceptance incentives. We show that sufficiently low minimum wages may do no harm to employment, since their job-offer disincentives are countervailed by their job-acceptance incentives. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:389 / 391
页数:3
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