Lobster trap limits: A solution to a communal action problem

Most major fisheries of the world are becoming depleted, largely by human over-exploitation. The basic problem is that fishers cannot or will not generate rules to conserve the resources upon which their livelihood depends. They are unable to solve this communal action dilemma although all would gain. Some fisher groups have been able to establish conservation-oriented guidelines either by lobbying the state (a centralized solution) or by generating self-imposed rules (a decentralized solution). We analyze the factors that allow lobster fishers on four Maine islands to benefit from self-imposed trap limits while most other lobster fishers must await decisions of the state legislature. It is argued that Knight's bargaining theory of norm development explains the trap limit. At root, trap limit rules are the result of a distributional fight over the resource. However, a number of other factors are necessary for fishers to constrain themselves informally. This case modifies and extends the use of rational choice theory in understanding the generation of rules for conserving resources.