The impacts of price responsiveness on strategic equilibrium in competitive electricity markets

被引:20
作者
Bompard, Ettore
Ma, Yuchao
Napoli, Roberto
Abrate, Graziano
Ragazzi, Elena
机构
[1] Politecn Torino, Dept Elect Engn, I-10129 Turin, Italy
[2] CNR, CERIS, I-10024 Moncalieri, TO, Italy
关键词
competitive wholesale market; demand elasticity; strategic bidding; DEMAND-SIDE; POWER; NETWORKS;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijepes.2006.10.003
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
One of the most important aspects that may affect market welfare is that related to the low demand responsiveness to price. This situation may greatly impact the market performance causing low efficiency, high prices and a disproportional allocation of surpluses. The structure of electricity markets is usually oligopolistic; producers may bid prices higher than their marginal costs to the short run wholesale market, inducing outcome deviations from the perfect competitive benchmark. The possibility of gaming the market is amplified in the presence of low demand responsiveness to price. This paper proposes a model to assess the role of demand elasticity in mitigating the effects of supply side strategic bidding behavior. We model the supply side in a conjectural supply function (CSF) framework, which allows incorporation of exogenous changes in demand elasticity and different levels of competition in a given market. The impacts of demand responsiveness on the market performances are assessed through a set of proposed indices that are applied to a model of the Italian market. (C) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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页码:397 / 407
页数:11
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