Pyongyang's Survival Strategy Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea

被引:117
作者
Byman, Daniel [1 ,2 ]
Lind, Jennifer [3 ]
机构
[1] Georgetown Univ, A Walsh Sch Foreign Serv, Washington, DC 20057 USA
[2] Brookings Inst, Saban Ctr Middle E Policy, Washington, DC 20036 USA
[3] Dartmouth Coll, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1162/ISEC_a_00002
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Speculation about the future of the North Korean regime has been intense for nearly two decades. In the 1990s, economic crises and famine led to predictions of the Kim regime's imminent downfall. Today analysts highlight impending famine as well as threats to the regime's position brought by eroding information control. Several theories of authoritarian control help to explain how Kim Jong-il and his family have remained in power and how this might change over time. The Kim regime has employed a variety of authoritarian "tools" to protect itself both from popular revolt and from internal coups. Its social policies, reliance on certain ideas and nationalism, and use of force prevent the onset of revolution. Through numerous other tools (elite co-optation, manipulation of foreign governments for financial aid, and the "coup-proofing" of domestic institutions), the regime protects itself from coups d'etat and elite unrest. This framework not only helps to explain the past resilience of the regime, but it suggests that the regime is not in danger of being unseated by coups or revolution. Yet it also suggests that the regime has not adequately prepared for succession after Kim's death. This analysis has implications for policy planning about the future of the Korean Peninsula, as well as for negotiations with and coercive strategies toward Pyongyang.
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页码:44 / +
页数:33
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