Gender diversity in compensation committees and CEO pay: evidence from China

被引:66
作者
Usman, Muhammad [1 ]
Zhang, Junrui [1 ]
Wang, Fangjun [1 ]
Sun, Junqin [1 ]
Makki, Muhammad Abdul Majid [2 ]
机构
[1] Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Xian, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[2] Islamia Univ Bahawalpur, Dept Commerce, Bahawalpur, Pakistan
关键词
China; Gender diversity; CEO compensation; Compensation committee; Pay-performance relationship; CHIEF EXECUTIVE PAY; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; SEX-DIFFERENCES; DIRECTORS; WOMEN; OWNERSHIP; MEMBERSHIP; POWER;
D O I
10.1108/MD-09-2017-0815
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to address whether gender diversity on compensation committees ensures objective determination of CEOs' compensation. Design/methodology/approach - The authors use a sample of companies listed in China from 2006 to 2015. The authors use pooled ordinary least square regression as the baseline methodology, and two-stage least square regression and propensity score matching to control for endogeneity. Findings - The authors find evidence that gender-diverse compensation committees limit CEOs' total cash compensation and strengthen the link between CEO pay and firm performance, but only independent female directors have a significant impact, indicating that the monitoring effect outweighs the executive effect. Moreover, compensation committees with a critical mass of female directors have more impact on CEOs' total pay and the link between CEO pay and firm performance than do committees with a single female director. Finally, gender-diverse compensation committees are more effective in setting CEOs' compensation in state-controlled firms, where agency issues are more severe. Practical implications - Female directors can improve firm-level governance by monitoring management actions, such as setting CEOs' compensation. The study contributes to the debate on gender diversity in the boardroom, finding a positive economic effect. The study sheds light on China's diversity practices at the director level and provides empirical guidance to China's regulatory bodies. Originality/value - The authors extend earlier studies by providing the first empirical evidence that gender-diverse compensation committees strengthen the link between CEO pay and firm performance; that independent female directors are more effective in the monitoring role than executive female directors; that compensation committees with a critical mass of female directors are more effective in setting CEOs' pay than are committees with a single female director; and that the influence of gender-diverse compensation committees on CEOs' pay varies by type of ownership.
引用
收藏
页码:1065 / 1087
页数:23
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