Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light

被引：31

作者：

Chistiakov, Vladimir ^{[1
]}

Huang, Anqi ^{[2
,3
,4
,5
]}

Egorov, Vladimir ^{[1
]}

Makarov, Vadim ^{[6
,7
,8
,9
,10
]}

机构：

[1] ITMO Univ, Fac Photon & Opt Informat, St Petersburg, Russia

[2] Natl Univ Def Technol, Coll Comp, Inst Quantum Informat, Changsha 410073, Hunan, Peoples R China

[3] Natl Univ Def Technol, Coll Comp, State Key Lab High Performance Comp, Changsha 410073, Hunan, Peoples R China

[4] Univ Waterloo, Inst Quantum Comp, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada

[5] Univ Waterloo, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada

[6] Russian Quantum Ctr, Moscow 143025, Russia

[7] Univ Sci & Technol China, Shanghai Branch, Natl Lab Phys Sci Microscale, Shanghai 201315, Peoples R China

[8] Univ Sci & Technol China, CAS Ctr Excellence Quantum Informat, Shanghai 201315, Peoples R China

[9] Natl Univ Sci & Technol MISiS, NTI Ctr Quantum Commun, Moscow 119049, Russia

[10] Univ Waterloo, Dept Phys & Astron, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada

来源：

OPTICS EXPRESS | 2019年 / 27卷 / 22期

基金：

加拿大创新基金会; 中国国家自然科学基金; 加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;

关键词：

QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION; ILLUMINATION ATTACK; BLINDING ATTACK; SECURITY; SYSTEM;

D O I：

10.1364/OE.27.032253

中图分类号：

O43 [光学];

学科分类号：

070207 ; 0803 ;

摘要：

We experimentally demonstrate that a single-photon detector ID210 commercially available from ID Quantique is vulnerable to blinding and can be fully controlled by bright illumination. In quantum key distribution, this vulnerability can be exploited by an eavesdropper to perform a faked-state attack giving her full knowledge of the key without being noticed. We consider the attack on standard BB84 protocol and a subcarrier-wave scheme and outline a possible countermeasure. (C) 2019 Optical Society of America under the terms of the OSA Open Access Publishing Agreement

引用

页码：32253 / 32262

页数：10

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