Two-Stage Dynamic Signal Detection: A Theory of Choice, Decision Time, and Confidence

被引:481
作者
Pleskac, Timothy J. [1 ]
Busemeyer, Jerome R. [2 ]
机构
[1] Michigan State Univ, Dept Psychol, E Lansing, MI 48823 USA
[2] Indiana Univ, Dept Psychol & Brain Sci, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
confidence; diffusion model; subjective probability; optimal solution; time pressure; PARADIGMS EMPHASIZING STATE; DIFFUSION-MODEL ACCOUNT; RESPONSE-TIME; RANDOM-WALK; RANDOM ERROR; PSYCHOPHYSICAL DISCRIMINATION; PROBABILITY JUDGMENT; PROCESS LIMITATIONS; RECOGNITION MEMORY; STOCHASTIC-MODELS;
D O I
10.1037/a0019737
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
The 3 most often-used performance measures in the cognitive and decision sciences are choice, response or decision time, and confidence. We develop a random walk/diffusion theory-2-stage dynamic signal detection (2DSD) theory-that accounts for all 3 measures using a common underlying process. The model uses a drift diffusion process to account for choice and decision time. To estimate confidence, we assume that evidence continues to accumulate after the choice. Judges then interrupt the process to categorize the accumulated evidence into a confidence rating. The model explains all known interrelationships between the 3 indices of performance. Furthermore, the model also accounts for the distributions of each variable in both a perceptual and general knowledge task. The dynamic nature of the model also reveals the moderating effects of time pressure on the accuracy of choice and confidence. Finally, the model specifies the optimal solution for giving the fastest choice and confidence rating for a given level of choice and confidence accuracy. Judges are found to act in a manner consistent with the optimal solution when making confidence judgments.
引用
收藏
页码:864 / 901
页数:38
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