Stage financing and the role of convertible securities

被引:196
作者
Cornelli, F [1 ]
Yosha, O
机构
[1] London Business Sch, London, England
[2] CEPR, London, England
[3] Tel Aviv Univ, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1467-937X.00235
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Venture capital financing is characterized by extensive use of convertible securities and stage financing. In a model where a venture capitalist provides staged financing for a project, we illustrate an advantage of convertible debt (or warrants) over a mixture of debt and equity. Essentially, when the venture capitalist retains the option to abandon the project, the entrepreneur has an incentive to engage in window dressing and bias positively the short-term performance of the project, reducing the probability that it will be liquidated. An appropriately designed convertible security prevents such behaviour because window dressing also increases the probability that the venture capitalist will exercise the conversion option becoming the owner of a substantial fraction of the project's equity.
引用
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页码:1 / 32
页数:32
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