机构:
Technion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, IsraelTechnion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel
Penn, Michal
[1
]
Polukarov, Maria
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:Technion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel
Polukarov, Maria
Tennenholtz, Moshe
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Technion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel
Microsoft Israel R&D Ctr, IL-46725 Herzliyya, IsraelTechnion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel
Tennenholtz, Moshe
[1
,2
]
机构:
[1] Technion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel
[2] Microsoft Israel R&D Ctr, IL-46725 Herzliyya, Israel
Congestion games;
Failures;
Tax;
Pure strategy Nash-equilibrium;
Algorithm;
D O I:
10.1007/s10472-009-9164-3
中图分类号:
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号:
081104 ;
0812 ;
0835 ;
1405 ;
摘要:
In this paper, we introduce and study Taxed Congestion Games with Failures [TCGFs], extending congestion games with failures [CGFs] to consider costly task submission. We define TCGFs, and prove that TCGFs possess a pure strategy Nash-equilibrium. Moreover, we provide an efficient algorithm for the computation of such equilibrium. We also provide a specialized, simpler, algorithm for the case in which all resources are identical.
机构:
Univ Salento, Dept Math & Phys Ennio De Giorgi, POB 193, I-73100 Lecce, ItalyUniv Salento, Dept Math & Phys Ennio De Giorgi, POB 193, I-73100 Lecce, Italy
Bilo, Vittorio
Vinci, Cosimo
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Gran Sasso Sci Inst, Laquila, ItalyUniv Salento, Dept Math & Phys Ennio De Giorgi, POB 193, I-73100 Lecce, Italy