A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk

被引：257

作者：

Crawford, V ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1998年 / 78卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.1997.2359

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper is a survey of experimental evidence on behavior in ames with communication focusing on environments where "talk is cheap" in the sense that players' messages have no direct payoff implications. Also considered are some environments in which communication was permitted throughout the game, in addition to those environments in which only preplay communication was allowed. (C) 1998 Academic Press.

引用

页码：286 / 298

页数：13

共 39 条

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[2]

Banks Jeffrey S., 1991, SIGNALING GAMES POLI

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