Local and consistent centrality measures in parameterized networks

被引:11
作者
Dequiedt, Vianney [1 ]
Zenou, Yves [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Clermont Auvergne, CNRS, CERDI, F-63000 Clermont Ferrand, France
[2] Monash Univ, Dept Econ, Clayton, Vic, Australia
[3] IFN, Stockholm, Sweden
关键词
SOCIAL NETWORKS; RANKING; AXIOMS; GAMES; POWER; SIDE;
D O I
10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.04.002
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We propose an axiomatic approach to characterize centrality measures for which the centrality of an agent is recursively related to the centralities of the agents she is connected to. This includes the Katz-Bonacich and the eigenvector centrality. The core of our argument hinges on the power of the consistency axiom, which relates the properties of the measure for a given network to its properties for a reduced problem. In our case, the reduced problem only keeps track of local and parsimonious information. Our axiomatic characterization highlights the conceptual similarities among those measures. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:28 / 36
页数:9
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