Impact of Roles Assignation on Heterogeneous Populations in Evolutionary Dictator Game

被引：21

作者：

Deng, Xinyang ^{[1
]}

Liu, Qi ^{[2
,3
]}

Sadiq, Rehan ^{[4
]}

Deng, Yong ^{[1
,5
,6
]}

机构：

[1] Southwest Univ, Sch Comp & Informat Sci, Chongqing 400715, Peoples R China

[2] Vanderbilt Univ, Sch Med, Ctr Quantitat Sci, Nashville, TN 37232 USA

[3] Vanderbilt Univ, Sch Med, Dept Biomed Informat, Nashville, TN 37232 USA

[4] Univ British Columbia, Sch Engn, Kelowna, BC V1V 1V7, Canada

[5] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Automat, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China

[6] Vanderbilt Univ, Sch Engn, Nashville, TN 37235 USA

来源：

SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 2014年 / 4卷

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金; 国家高技术研究发展计划(863计划);

关键词：

PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME; SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY; INCLUSIVE FITNESS THEORY; PROMOTES COOPERATION; SOCIAL DILEMMAS; EMERGENCE; SELECTION; FAIRNESS; NETWORKS; DYNAMICS;

D O I：

10.1038/srep06937

中图分类号：

O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];

学科分类号：

07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;

摘要：

The evolution of cooperation is a hot and challenging topic in the field of evolutionary game theory. Altruistic behavior, as a particular form of cooperation, has been widely studied by the ultimatum game but not by the dictator game, which provides a more elegant way to identify the altruistic component of behaviors. In this paper, the evolutionary dictator game is applied to model the real motivations of altruism. A degree-based regime is utilized to assess the impact of the assignation of roles on evolutionary outcome in populations of heterogeneous structure with two kinds of strategic updating mechanisms, which are based on Darwin's theory of evolution and punctuated equilibrium, respectively. The results show that the evolutionary outcome is affected by the role assignation and that this impact also depends on the strategic updating mechanisms, the function used to evaluate players' success, and the structure of populations.

引用

页数：13

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