Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in -Priority-Based Matching

被引：37

作者：

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila ^{[1
,2
]}

Che, Yeon-Koo ^{[3
]}

Pathak, Parag A. ^{[2
,4
]}

Roth, Alvin E. ^{[5
]}

Tercieux, Olivier ^{[6
]}

机构：

[1] Duke Univ, Dept Econ, Durham, NC 27706 USA

[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] Columbia Univ, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10027 USA

[4] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

[5] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[6] Paris Sch Econ, Paris, France

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW-INSIGHTS | 2020年 / 2卷 / 04期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

SCHOOL CHOICE; COLLEGE ADMISSIONS; STRATEGY-PROOFNESS; ALLOCATION; STABILITY; MARKET; ASSIGNMENT;

D O I：

10.1257/aeri.20190307

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Top trading cycles (TTC) is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof in priority-based matching, but so are other mechanisms including serial dictatorship. We show that TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms in one-to-one matching. In many-to-one matching, TTC admits less justified envy than serial dictatorship in an average sense. Empirical evidence from New Orleans OneApp and Boston Public Schools shows that TTC has significantly less justified envy than serial dictatorship.

引用

页码：425 / 441

页数：17

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