Role of the Industry in the Enforcement of the Tobacco Policy

被引:0
作者
Tosza, Stanislaw [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Luxembourg, Compliance & Law Enforcement, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
来源
UTRECHT LAW REVIEW | 2021年 / 17卷 / 01期
关键词
enforcement; illicit tobacco; tobacco industry; smuggling; counterfeiting; compliance;
D O I
10.36633/ulr.611
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
Tobacco products are heavily regulated because, in particular, of their acknowledged harmfulness to health, with highly elevated prices as one of the most important means of discouraging consumption. One of the most serious threats to the effectiveness of the tobacco policy comes from the trafficking of illicit tobacco, which is much cheaper, often of lower quality, and which reduces state and EU revenues. The achievement of tobacco policy objectives, in particular the combatting of illicit tobacco trade, depends on the participation of private actors, amongst which big industry plays a crucial role. Yet, the legal landscape of enforcement duties of the tobacco industry is a patchwork of instruments, unevenly affecting different players. In particular it includes controversial agreements between the major tobacco producers and the EU and Member States, to which three out of four major producers are subject. The agreement with the fourth - PMI - was not extended by the Commission in 2016. The decision as to the extension of the remaining agreements is looming. The objective of this article is to analyse the framework of duties of the tobacco industry in the enforcement of the tobacco policy, especially against illicit tobacco, and to reflect on whether the enforcement model, including the agreements with the tobacco producers, should be kept or abandoned.
引用
收藏
页码:59 / 72
页数:14
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