The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications

被引:12
作者
Dietrich, Franz [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Maastricht Univ, Dept Quantitat Econ, NL-6211 LM Maastricht, Netherlands
[2] London Sch Econ, CPNSS, London WC2A 2AE, England
关键词
Judgment aggregation; Subjunctive implication; Material implication; Characterisation of possibility agendas; IMPOSSIBILITY; CONSTRAINTS; THEOREM; MODEL; SETS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The new field of judgment aggregation aims to find collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like "if a then b" are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and complete collective judgments can be reached through appropriate quota rules (which decide propositions using acceptance thresholds). I characterise the class of these quota rules. I also prove an abstract result that characterises consistent aggregation for arbitrary agendas in a general logic. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:603 / 638
页数:36
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