Internal Migration and Public Policy

被引：1

作者：

Giuranno, Michele G. ^{[1
]}

Biswas, Rongili ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Salento, Dipartimento Sci Econ A De Viti De Marco, I-73100 Lecce, Italy

[2] Maulana Azad Coll, Kolkata, India

来源：

B E JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY | 2019年 / 19卷 / 04期

关键词：

public goods; bargaining; political economy; POLITICAL-ECONOMY; CONVERGENCE; INEQUALITY; WAGES; SIZE;

D O I：

10.1515/bejeap-2018-0203

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper studies the relation between internal migration and public spending on public goods. We describe centralized public policy when a central government is comprised of elected representatives from local electoral districts. Internal migration determines the median voter in the districts. The median voters decide the equilibrium policy through bargaining. We find the conditions under which voters' mobility results in larger or smaller public spending. Furthermore, the distance between the actual size and the efficient size of government spending depends on the way internal migration changes the distribution of income within and between districts.

引用

页数：16