Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind

被引：354

作者：

Bloom, P ^{[1
]}

German, TP

机构：

[1] Yale Univ, Dept Psychol, New Haven, CT 06520 USA

[2] Univ Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ, Essex, England

来源：

COGNITION | 2000年 / 77卷 / 01期

关键词：

cognitive development; false belief task; theory of mind;

D O I：

10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00096-2

中图分类号：

B84 [心理学];

学科分类号：

04 ; 0402 ;

摘要：

The false belief task has often been used as a test of theory of mind. We present two reasons to abandon this practice. First, passing the false belief task requires abilities other than theory of mind. Second, theory of mind need not entail the ability to reason about false beliefs. We conclude with an alternative conception of the role of the false belief task. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：B25 / B31

页数：7

共 46 条

[1] INFANTS CONTRIBUTION TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF JOINT REFERENCE [J].