An experimental solidarity game

被引:145
作者
Selten, R
Ockenfels, A
机构
[1] Otto Von Guericke Univ, Fac Econ & Management, D-39016 Magdeburg, Germany
[2] Univ Bonn, D-5300 Bonn, Germany
关键词
experimental economics; bounded rationality; altruism; gender; education; false consensus;
D O I
10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00107-8
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
120 subjects played a three-person-game in which each player could win DM 10,00 with probability 2/3. Before the independent random decisions were made, the players had to decide under double blind conditions how much they were willing to give to one loser or each of two losers in the case of their winning. The great majority of subjects were willing to make substantial conditional gifts. The most common type of gift behavior does not lend itself to a straightforward interpretation as the result of altruistic utility maximization. We found an-education effect, a gender effect, and a false consensus effect. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:517 / 539
页数:23
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