A Sensor Fusion-Based GNSS Spoofing Attack Detection Framework for Autonomous Vehicles

被引:38
作者
Dasgupta, Sagar [1 ]
Rahman, Mizanur [1 ]
Islam, Mhafuzul [2 ]
Chowdhury, Mashrur [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Alabama, Dept Civil Construct & Environm Engn, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 USA
[2] Gen Motors, Warren, MI 48092 USA
[3] Clemson Univ, Dept Civil Engn, Clemson, SC 29634 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Global navigation satellite system; Antenna measurements; Global Positioning System; Receivers; Accelerometers; Wheels; Inertial sensors; Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS); autonomous vehicle; cybersecurity; spoofing attack; LSTM; INS;
D O I
10.1109/TITS.2022.3197817
中图分类号
TU [建筑科学];
学科分类号
0813 ;
摘要
This paper presents a sensor fusion-based Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing attack detection framework for autonomous vehicles (AVs) that consists of two strategies: (i) comparison between predicted location shift-i.e., distance traveled between two consecutive timestamps-and inertial sensor based location shift in addition to monitoring of vehicle motion states-i.e., standstill/ in motion; and (ii) detection and classification of turns (left or right) along with detection of vehicle motion states. In the first strategy, data from low-cost in-vehicle inertial sensors-i.e., speedometer, accelerometer, and steering angle sensor-are fused and fed to a long short-term memory (LSTM) neural network to predict the distance an AV will travel between two consecutive timestamps. The second strategy combines k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) and Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algorithms to detect a turn and then classify left and right turns using steering angle sensor output. In both strategies, the GNSS-derived speed is compared with speedometer output to improve the effectiveness of the framework presented in this paper. To prove the efficacy of the sensor fusion-based attack detection framework, attack datasets are created for four unique spoofing attack scenarios-turn-by-turn, overshoot, wrong turn, and stop, using the publicly available real-world Honda Research Institute Driving Dataset (HDD). Analyses conducted in this study reveal that the sensor fusion-based detection framework successfully detects all four types of spoofing attacks within the required computational latency threshold.
引用
收藏
页码:23559 / 23572
页数:14
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