Risk Retention Rules and the Issuance of Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities

被引:5
作者
Agarwal, Sumit [1 ]
Ambrose, Brent W. [2 ]
Yildirim, Yildiray [3 ]
Zhang, Jian [4 ]
机构
[1] Natl Univ Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
[2] Penn State Univ, Smeal Coll Business, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
[3] Baruch Coll, Zicklin Sch Business, New York, NY USA
[4] Univ Hong Kong, Fac Business & Econ, Pok Fu Lam, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
CMBS; Risk retention; Dodd-frank act; Qualified mortgages; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1007/s11146-021-09837-1
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We study the impact of the risk retention rule - requiring 5% of underlying credit risk for commercial mortgage backed securities - on commercial real estate markets. Since the primary objective of this rule is for the deal sponsors to have skin in the game, we expect that underwriting standards should tighten following the implementation of the rule. Consistent with this notion, we find the reform led to a decrease in price premium and probability of rating shopping by the sponsors, as well as longer time-to-securitization and lower default probability. We also show that the Dodd-Frank risk retention rule can impact banks' credit supply by curtailing credit growth. As a result, we provide novel evidence on the effect of the risk retention rule on underwriters most exposed to the regulation.
引用
收藏
页码:684 / 714
页数:31
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