Sharing, gift-giving, and optimal resource use in hunter-gatherer society

被引:5
作者
Baker, Matthew J. [1 ,2 ]
Swope, Kurtis J. [3 ]
机构
[1] CUNY, Hunter Coll, Hunter Coll Dept Econ, 695 Pk Ave, New York, NY 10065 USA
[2] CUNY, Grad Ctr, 695 Pk Ave, New York, NY 10065 USA
[3] US Naval Acad, Annapolis, MD 21402 USA
关键词
Sharing; Gift-giving; Common property; Hunter-gatherers; Resource management; WEALTH TRANSMISSION; ACHE FORAGERS; PROPERTY; INEQUALITY; EVOLUTION;
D O I
10.1007/s10101-021-00254-x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Hunter-gatherer societies are characterized by decentralized decision making and shared access to resources. Goods are distributed via reciprocal exchange, sharing, and gift-giving, in the end resulting in relatively equal distribution. Work effort, however, is not distributed equally; the best hunters exert a disproportionate share of productive effort. We argue that these features of the hunter-gatherer economy are interrelated, and are consistent with the view that customary gift-giving and sharing arrangements manage usage of open-access resources. In particular, sharing rules can induce optimal hunting effort, while gift-giving can serve to elicit information about hunter productivity.
引用
收藏
页码:119 / 138
页数:20
相关论文
共 47 条
  • [1] Risk-Pooling and Herd Survival: An Agent-Based Model of a Maasai Gift-Giving System
    Aktipis, C. Athena
    Cronk, Lee
    de Aguiar, Rolando
    [J]. HUMAN ECOLOGY, 2011, 39 (02) : 131 - 140
  • [2] ALCHIAN AA, 1973, J ECON HIST, V33, P16, DOI 10.1017/S0022050700076403
  • [3] Some empirical evidence on property rights of first peoples
    Anderson, CL
    Swimmer, E
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 1997, 33 (01) : 1 - 22
  • [4] Entrenched Disbelief: Complex Hunter-Gatherers and the Case for Inclusive Cultural Evolutionary Thinking
    Arnold, Jeanne E.
    Sunell, Scott
    Nigra, Benjamin T.
    Bishop, Katelyn J.
    Jones, Terrah
    Bongers, Jacob
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHOD AND THEORY, 2016, 23 (02) : 448 - 499
  • [5] An equilibrium conflict model of land tenure in hunter-gatherer societies
    Baker, MJ
    [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2003, 111 (01) : 124 - 173
  • [6] Borgers T, 2015, An introduction to the theory of mechanism design
  • [7] Cashdan, 1990, RISK UNCERTAINTY TRI, P89
  • [8] Stakeholder incentives and reforms in China's state-owned enterprises: A common-property theory
    Cauley, J
    Cornes, R
    Sandler, T
    [J]. CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1999, 10 (02) : 191 - 206
  • [9] Cornes RichardSandler., 1996, THEORY EXTERNALITIES, V2nd
  • [10] DISSOLVING A PARTNERSHIP EFFICIENTLY
    CRAMTON, P
    GIBBONS, R
    KLEMPERER, P
    [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (03) : 615 - 632