Preferences and Social Influence

被引：22

作者：

Fershtman, Chaim ^{[1
,2
]}

Segal, Uzi ^{[3
,4
]}

机构：

[1] Tel Aviv Univ, Dept Econ, IL-6997801 Tel Aviv, Israel

[2] CEPR, Washington, DC 20009 USA

[3] Boston Coll, Dept Econ, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA

[4] Univ Warwick, Behav Sci Grp, Warwick Business Sch, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS | 2018年 / 10卷 / 03期

关键词：

ECONOMICS; COMPETITION; FAIRNESS; NORMS;

D O I：

10.1257/mic.20160190

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Interaction between decision makers may affect their preferences. We consider a setup in which each individual is characterized by two sets of preferences: his unchanged core preferences and his behavioral preferences. Each individual has a social influence function that determines his behavioral preferences given his core preferences and the behavioral preferences of other individuals in his group. Decisions are made according to behavioral preferences. The paper considers different properties of these social influence functions and their effect on equilibrium behavior.

引用

页码：124 / 142

页数：19

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