Discussion of "Are Related Party Transactions Red Flags?"

被引:11
作者
Jorgensen, Bjorn N. [1 ]
Morley, Julia [1 ]
机构
[1] London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, London, England
关键词
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; SECURITIES-LAWS; FAMILY FIRMS; OWNERSHIP; PERFORMANCE; CULTURE; QUALITY; ERRORS;
D O I
10.1111/1911-3846.12304
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2017) create a new data set featuring two types of related party transactions. They use empirical-archival methods to investigate the effect of such transactions on the likelihood of restatements and on audit fees. Their findings suggest that related party transactions related to directors, officers and major shareholders are associated with poor "tone at the top" and that this leads management to negotiate for lower-quality audits to minimize monitoring costs. To offer avenues for future research, we focus our discussion on three aspects of their paper related to causality, definitions of variables, and generalizability to non-U.S. jurisdictions.
引用
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页码:929 / 939
页数:11
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