Human behaviour: Don't lose your reputation

被引：152

作者：

Fehr, E ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Zurich, Inst Empir Res Econ, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland

来源：

NATURE | 2004年 / 432卷 / 7016期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1038/432449a

中图分类号：

O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];

学科分类号：

07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;

摘要：

Collective action in large groups whose members are genetically unrelated is a distinguishing feature of the human species. Individual reputations may be a key to a satisfactory evolutionary explanation.

引用

页码：449 / 450

页数：2

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