The Impact of the CEO's Personal Narcissism on Non-GAAP Earnings

被引:37
作者
Abdel-Meguid, Ahmed [1 ]
Jennings, Jared N. [2 ]
Olsen, Kari Joseph [3 ]
Soliman, Mark T. [4 ]
机构
[1] Amer Univ Cairo, Cairo, Egypt
[2] Washington Univ, St Louis, MO 63110 USA
[3] Utah Valley Univ, Orem, UT USA
[4] Univ Southern Calif, Los Angeles, CA 90007 USA
关键词
non-GAAP earnings; earnings persistence; narcissism; executive personality traits; PRO FORMA EARNINGS; PREDICTIVE-VALUE; UPPER ECHELONS; MANAGERS; ANALYSTS; DETERMINANTS; DISCLOSURE; STREET;
D O I
10.2308/TAR-2017-0612
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Non-GAAP earnings provide managers the flexibility to exclude GAAP items to either produce a more informative performance measure or provide them the ability to opportunistically exclude recurring expenses from non-GAAP earnings. Prior literature examines the use of this form of disclosure at the firm level, although it is ultimately management's decision. We extend prior non-GAAP literature by examining whether the use and quality of non-GAAP earnings is influenced by CEO personality traits, namely, CEO narcissism. We find that narcissistic CEOs are more likely to exclude expenses from non-GAAP earnings and that the magnitude of exclusions is greater. We also find that those non-GAAP exclusions are more persistent and, thus, lower-quality. Our results shed light on the disclosure practice of non-GAAP earnings and show how narcissistic CEOs are more likely to take advantage of the discretion in financial reporting disclosures in order to benefit the firm and themselves.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 25
页数:25
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