Communist party control and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

被引：45

作者：

Li, Xiaorong ^{[1
]}

Chan, Kam C. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Publ Finance, Beijing, Peoples R China

[2] Western Kentucky Univ, Gordon Ford Coll Business, Bowling Green, KY 42101 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2016年 / 141卷

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Communist party control; Crash risk; Information; External monitoring; PERFORMANCE; FIRMS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.018

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine Communist Party of China (CPC) control on a firm's crash risk. Our findings suggest that having a CPC committee member serves as a director can lower a firm's crash risk. Other forms of control do not lower such a risk. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：5 / 7

页数：3

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