Small-Scale Farmers' Preference Heterogeneity for Green Agriculture Policy Incentives Identified by Choice Experiment

被引:9
作者
Zhu, Yaying [1 ]
Chen, Juan [2 ]
机构
[1] Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Business Adm, Wuhan 430073, Peoples R China
[2] Anhui Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Business Adm, Bengbu 233030, Peoples R China
关键词
green agriculture; ecological fertilization; ecological deinsectization; sustainable policy; farmer preference heterogeneity; choice experiment; CONSERVATION AGRICULTURE; ADOPTION; REVOLUTION; PESTICIDES; DESIGN; MODEL; TECHNOLOGIES; CONSUMPTION; BEHAVIOR; SCHEMES;
D O I
10.3390/su14105770
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
This study addresses differentiation among small-scale farmers' preferences for green agriculture policy incentive mixes. Transforming modern agriculture to ecological fertilization and pest extermination practices is paramount in developing green agriculture, but policy incentives aimed at stimulating small-scale farmers' adoption of ecological fertilization and deinsectization techniques are often challenged by those farmers' heterogeneous characteristics and their consequent mixed incentive preferences. We establish a model examining the interplay between small-scale farmers' characteristics (e.g., age, education level, family size, participation in agricultural organization) and combinations of incentive policies (i.e., green subsidy, technical support, environmental propaganda, agricultural insurance) in farmers' willingness to participate in ecological fertilization/deinsectization, using a sample of 1032 Chinese farmers. By applying a mixed logit model and latent class model regressions, we find that farmers' age, education level, family size, and farming organization participation are the most important characteristics influencing farmers' preferences. Specifically, senior farmers tend to accept an incentive policy combination of green subsidy and technical support; farmers with higher education levels prefer an incentive policy combination of technical support and environmental propaganda; and larger families prefer an incentive policy combination of technical support and agricultural insurance. Additionally, participation in any agricultural organization reduces the household's preference for incentive policy combinations of technical support, agricultural insurance, and green subsidy. Based on these findings, a typology of small farmers' green agriculture incentive preferences (including security, monetary, and autonomy orientations) is proposed, offering suggestions for future green agriculture policy optimization.
引用
收藏
页数:19
相关论文
共 90 条
  • [51] Mahul O., 2010, GOVT SUPPORT AGR INS
  • [52] Do Land Ownership and Agro-Ecological Location of Farmland Influence Adoption of Improved Rice Varieties? Evidence from Sierra Leone
    Mansaray, Bashiru
    Jin, Shaosheng
    Horlu, Godwin S. Agbemavor
    [J]. AGRICULTURE-BASEL, 2019, 9 (12):
  • [53] Green revolution- and wetland-linked technological change of rice agriculture in Indonesia
    Mariyono, Joko
    [J]. MANAGEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 2015, 26 (05) : 683 - 700
  • [54] Marrone PG, 2009, INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS, TACTICS, STRATEGIES AND CASE STUDIES, P163
  • [55] Meena R. S., 2013, Annals of Biology (Hissar), V29, P301
  • [56] Munasib A. B. A., 2011, Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, V43, P213
  • [57] Nakajima N., 2001, B SCI TECHNOL SOC, V21, P334, DOI [https://doi.org/10.1177/027046760102100502, DOI 10.1177/027046760102100502]
  • [58] Traditional knowledge and biodiversity conservation: a case study from Byans Valley in Kailash Sacred Landscape, India
    Negi, Vikram S.
    Pathak, Ravi
    Sekar, K. Chandra
    Rawal, R. S.
    Bhatt, I. D.
    Nandi, S. K.
    Dhyani, P. P.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, 2018, 61 (10) : 1722 - 1743
  • [59] Orbeta AC, 2006, POVERTY STRATEGIES IN ASIA: A GROWTH PLUS APPROACH, P171
  • [60] Green Consumption: Behavior and Norms
    Peattie, Ken
    [J]. ANNUAL REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCES, VOL 35, 2010, 35 : 195 - 228