Norms in an asymmetric Public Good experiment

被引：6

作者：

Spiller, Joerg

Ufert, Aneta

Vetter, Patrick

Will, Ulrike

机构：

[1] European Univ Viadrina Frankfurt Oder, Grosse Scharrnstr 59, D-15230 Frankfurt, Oder, Germany

[2] Bavarian Minist Econ Affairs & Media Energy & Tec, Dept Energy Policy & Energy Infrastruct, D-80538 Munich, Germany

[3] European Univ Viadrina Frankfurt Oder, Dept Stat, Grosse Scharrnstr 59, D-15230 Frankfurt, Oder, Germany

[4] Tech Univ Dresden, Fac Law, Int European & Publ Law, D-01062 Dresden, Germany

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2016年 / 142卷

关键词：

Experimental economics; Public good; Asymmetric endowments; Belief elicitation; Norms; CONDITIONAL COOPERATION; BELIEFS; GAMES;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.014

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a Public Good experiment we find that rich and poor players have different fairness considerations and that contributions are influenced but not determined by what they think is 'right' and by 'what others do' who are like them. (c) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：35 / 44

页数：10

共 16 条

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