Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops

被引：121
作者：
Farhi, Emmanuel [1 ]
Tirole, Jean [2 ]
机构：
[1] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] TSE, Toulouse, France
来源：
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 2018年 / 85卷 / 03期
基金：
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词：
Feedback loop; Bailouts; Sovereign default; Banking unions; TIME-INCONSISTENCY; MATURITY STRUCTURE; DEFAULT RISK; PUBLIC DEBT; BAILOUTS; CRISES; ECONOMIES; LIQUIDITY; FRAGILITY; BANKING;
D O I：
10.1093/restud/rdx059
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The recent unravelling of the Eurozone's financial integration raised concerns about feedback loops between sovereign and banking insolvency. This article provides a theory of the feedback loop that allows for both domestic bailouts of the banking system and sovereign debt forgiveness by international creditors or solidarity by other countries. Our theory has important implications for the re-nationalization of sovereign debt, macroprudential regulation, and the rationale for banking unions.
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页码：1781 / 1823
页数：43
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