Building Evidence for Public Human Resource Management: Using Middle Range Theory to Link Theory and Data

被引:28
作者
Abner, Gordon B. [1 ]
Kim, Sun Young [2 ]
Perry, James L. [2 ]
机构
[1] Indiana Univ, Publ Policy, 1315 E Tenth St, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA
[2] Indiana Univ, Sch Publ & Environm Affairs, 1315 E Tenth St, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA
关键词
middle range theory; performance-related pay; representative bureaucracy; REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY; ACTIVE REPRESENTATION; SERVICE MOTIVATION; PRIVATE-SECTOR; GENDER REPRESENTATION; PERFORMANCE; DIVERSITY; INCENTIVES; RACE; PAY;
D O I
10.1177/0734371X17697248
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
Theory building within public administration has been slow and uneven, due in part to the field's search for grand theories and its failure to systematize knowledge. Middle range theory may be a particularly useful theory-building strategy for public administration scholarship due to its emphasis on generating testable hypotheses, organizing knowledge about particular phenomena, and bridging gaps between empirical facts and theory. Its utility for the development of public human resource management theory is illustrated based on examples from performance-related pay and representative bureaucracy research. We present a series of theoretical statements about performance-related pay and representative bureaucracy, and we identify the extent to which these statements are supported by empirical evidence. The examples both illustrate the utility of the theory-building strategy and identify theoretical statements that are widely confirmed and others that need additional testing.
引用
收藏
页码:139 / 159
页数:21
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